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EASTERN

F.O.  
371

1947

PALESTINE

File No. 2

pp. 1231 - 1500



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UNTIL

1978

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61748



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PALESTINE

10 FEB

Registry  
Number

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FROM

11 Kist Palestine

No.

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Dated

P.C. (HID) 5

Received  
in Registry

7 Feb 1947

10 Feb 1947

Last Paper.

1121

References.

2359/115/31

(Print.)

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(How disposed of.)

C. Dept Bombs.

Amman

Beirut

Bagdad

B.M.K.O.

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F.O.R.D.

P.T.O.

(Action  
completed.)

G.E.M. 1/2

(Index.)

5/6/48

Next Paper.

1252

Palestine Conference.Transmit copy of plan submitted by  
British Delegation in basis for further  
negotiations on future of Palestine.

(Minutes.)

H.B. 11/12

In P.P. M. Bevin to Lord Eversfield.

In P.P. Cairo tel 384 11/2.

dfr to Cairo

Am -  
14/2

In P.P. O.O. Cairo tel 119 of 10/2

120 ~ ~

121 ~ ~

146 14/2

In P.P. Bagdad tel 157 of 20/2.

Tel. to Bagdad.

H.B. 21/2

In P.P. O.O. Cairo tel 227. 8/3.

H.B. 19/3  
P.T.O.

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3  
In P.P. D.O. Buro Ad 268 21/3

H.B. 25/3

3  
Tel. W. Lon. 1207  
Aptd. Cairo 296  
Bagdad 113  
Beirut 74  
Damascus 53  
Iddla 50  
Amman 46  
B.M.K.O. 136.  
Feb 7

Tel. W. Lon. 1208  
Cairo 297  
Bagdad 114  
Beirut 75  
Damascus 54  
Iddla 51  
Amman 47  
B.M.K.O. 137  
Feb 7.

E. Dept. Camps.  
Damascus.  
Feb. 12

Tel Cairo 372  
Feb 14.

Tel Bagdad.  
166  
21 Feb

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SECRET

P.C.(A)(P) 5

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10 FEB

PALESTINE CONFERENCE, 1946/47

Note by the British Delegation

The plan outlined in the annexed memorandum is submitted by the British Delegation as a basis for further negotiation on the future of Palestine.

The British Delegation are ready to meet the Arab Delegations at their earliest convenience to discuss the proposals in this memorandum.

These proposals are being communicated simultaneously to the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

ST. JAMES'S PALACE. S.W.1.

7TH FEBRUARY, 1947.

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1. Article 2 of the Mandate for Palestine defines the responsibilities of the mandatory power in the following terms:-

- (a) To place the country "under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble".
- (b) To place the country under such conditions as will "secure the development of self-governing institutions".
- (c) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 6 of the Mandate, which deals with Jewish immigration and the settlement of the Jews on the land, reads in part as follows:-

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions".

2. During the last 25 years, efforts have been made by the Mandatory Government to associate the population of the country with the Administration, but these have invariably broken down because it has not been possible to find a basis of co-operation acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. It has therefore not been possible to establish political institutions leading towards self-government.

3. A time has come when development in the direction of self-government can no longer be delayed. So long as government is imposed from without, neither community has the incentive to develop that sense of responsibility without which the two peoples in Palestine cannot live together in harmony. Forms of government must therefore be established which have their roots in the people of the country and which offer a prospect of full independence within a reasonably short period.

4. To this end it is proposed that the people of the country shall be given a large measure of responsibility for local affairs and shall be associated with the central Government as soon as the new policy is put into effect; that British participation in the Government shall not continue for longer than is necessary to effect the transition from Trusteeship to complete independence; and that a definite time limit shall be fixed for this period of transition. The period suggested is five years. In other words, it is proposed that His Majesty's Government should administer a five-year Trusteeship over Palestine, with the declared object of preparing the country for independence.

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5. Under these proposals, His Majesty's Government would be carrying on the obligations which already rest upon them under the Mandate. At the same time, they would be looking forward to an early termination of the Trust, and would be acting in full conformity with the provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Charter.

If it emerged from the present discussions that the initiation of such a policy would command substantial acquiescence from both communities in Palestine, interim arrangements in harmony with this policy could no doubt be made in advance of its formal approval by the United Nations.

6. The essential features of the proposed Trusteeship Agreement are outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### Local Government

7. Areas of local administration would be delimited in such a way as to include in each a substantial majority either of Arabs or of Jews. To the local Administrations the central Government would devolve a wide range of powers, legislative, administrative and financial, including some share in responsibility for the police. As the local administrative boundaries would not have the character of State frontiers, it would not necessarily follow that all the Arab or all the Jewish territory need be contiguous.

8. Safeguards would be provided for the rights of the Jewish population in Arab areas and of the Arab population in Jewish areas. The rights of these minorities would include:-

- (a) Adequate representation in local legislatures;
- (b) A reasonable proportion of posts in the local administration;
- (c) Freedom of religious practice in accordance with the status quo, including the maintenance of separate religious courts for matters of personal status;
- (d) The right to maintain their own educational institutions;
- (e) The right to use their own language in their communications with the Administration and in the Courts of Law.

It would be a special responsibility of the High Commissioner to ensure the maintenance of these rights.

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6

5. Under these proposals, His Majesty's Government would be carrying on the obligations which already rest upon them under the Mandate. At the same time, they would be looking forward to an early termination of the Trust, and would be acting in full conformity with the provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Charter.

If it emerged from the present discussions that the initiation of such a policy would command substantial acquiescence from both communities in Palestine, interim arrangements in harmony with this policy could no doubt be made in advance of its formal approval by the United Nations.

6. The essential features of the proposed Trusteeship Agreement are outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### Local Government

7. Areas of local administration would be delimited in such a way as to include in each a substantial majority either of Arabs or of Jews. To the local Administrations the central Government would devolve a wide range of powers, legislative, administrative and financial, including some share in responsibility for the police. As the local administrative boundaries would not have the character of State frontiers, it would not necessarily follow that all the Arab or all the Jewish territory need be contiguous.

8. Safeguards would be provided for the rights of the Jewish population in Arab areas and of the Arab population in Jewish areas. The rights of these minorities would include:-

- (a) Adequate representation in local legislatures;
- (b) A reasonable proportion of posts in the local Administration;
- (c) Freedom of religious practice in accordance with the status quo, including the maintenance of separate religious courts for matters of personal status;
- (d) The right to maintain their own educational institutions;
- (e) The right to use their own language in their communications with the Administration and in the Courts of Law.

It would be a special responsibility of the High Commissioner to ensure the maintenance of these rights.

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### Immigration

9. The British Delegation cannot accept the contention of the representatives of the Jewish Agency that the rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine as a whole should be determined by the Jews alone. Nor can they accept the demand of the Arab Delegations that all Jewish immigration into Palestine should cease forthwith. They do not contemplate either a settlement which would bring to an end the development of the Jewish National Home, or the admission of Jewish immigrants without reference to the effect of their entry on the rights and position of the population of the country. Any provisions made for future Jewish immigration must rest upon consideration for the wellbeing of Palestine as a whole.

10. With this end in view the Trusteeship Agreement would provide for Jewish immigration, at a rate of 4,000 monthly, for a period of two years. This would guarantee the entry of approximately 100,000 additional Jewish immigrants. During the remainder of the period of Trusteeship, the continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined, with due regard to the principle of economic absorption capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council; and in the event of disagreement the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations.

### Land Transfers

11. Control over transfers of land, including the power to amend the existing Land Transfers Regulations, would be conferred on the local authorities.

### Central Government

12. The High Commissioner would continue to exercise supreme legislative and executive authority. He would, however, endeavour to form an Advisory Council so composed as to include representatives, not only, of the Arab and Jewish local Administrations, but also of labour and other organised interests. Despite this composition, it is probable that voting in the Advisory Council would tend at first to follow communal lines. Since, however, the functions of the Council would be advisory and not legislative, the High Commissioner would be required to give due attention to the views of minorities. On the conclusion of the Trusteeship Agreement, the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supercede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner.

13. During the period of trusteeship, the High Commissioner would introduce Palestinians into his Executive Council, and would progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members in that Council.

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authority from ~~her~~  
J.R.D.

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11

Cypher/OTP

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON NO. 1207  
CAIRO NO. 296

CAIRO NO. 296

BAGDAD NO. 113

BEIRUT NO. 74

DAMASCUS NO. 53

JEDDA NO. 50

AMMAN NO. 46

B.M.E.O. CAIRO NO. 136

F F F F

[Washington only] MOST IMMEDIATE.

2. If the Delegation find that no agreement can be reached on this basis, they will report whether in their judgment a solution on these lines is likely to meet with any substantial measure of acquiescence from even one of the two communities in Palestine. His Majesty's Government will then decide whether they would be justified in bringing such a scheme into operation on their own authority pending the negotiation of a Trusteeship Agreement.

4. [All posts other than Washington and B.M.E.O.]  
You may communicate to the Government to which you are  
accredited a copy of my following telegram making it clear  
that the proposals must not be published without authority  
from here.

that the proposals must not be passed  
from here.  
[Cairo only] Please pass paragraphs 1 to 3 to B.M.E.O.  
as Foreign Office telegram No. 136.

FO 371 / 61728



Registry  
No.

Top Secret.  
~~Secret~~  
Confidential.  
~~Restricted~~  
~~Open~~

Draft. TELEGRAM to  
Washington (and  
posts below)

Date.

No. 1208

Cypher. Feb 7

Departmental No. 2

CABINET DIST.

Repeat to

✓ Cairo. 297

✓ Bagdad. 114

✓ Beirut. 75

✓ Damascus 54

Jedda 51

Amman 47

British Middle  
East Office. 137

H.B.

773.6/2

OUT/FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

6th February 1947

~~IMMEDIATE~~

[Washington only] MOST IMMEDIATE

My immediately preceding telegram.

I Following is summary of the  
proposals.

The document begins by reciting  
our obligations under the Mandate, and  
points out that during the last 25 years  
we have done our best to further the  
legitimate aspirations of the Jews without  
prejudicing the interests of the Arabs.  
We have not however been able to "secure the  
development of self-governing institutions"  
in accordance with the Mandate  
because it has not been possible to find  
a basis of co-operation acceptable to  
both Arabs and Jews. A time has  
come when development in the direction  
of self-government can no longer be  
delayed. Forms of government must now  
be established which have their roots in  
the people of the country and which offer  
a prospect of full independence within a  
reasonably short period.

2. Under our present proposals the  
people of the country would be associated  
with the Central Government from the  
outset and would be given a large measure  
of responsibility for local affairs.  
British participation in the government

would/

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would not continue for longer than ~~was~~  
necessary to effect the transition to  
complete independence, and this period of  
transition would be fixed at five years.

3. The proposals would be embodied  
in a Trusteeship Agreement. We  
believe that they are in conformity  
both with the obligations already  
resting upon us under the Mandate and  
with the provisions of Article 76 of  
the United Nations Charter.

4. There would necessarily be an  
interval between the present discussions  
and the conclusion of a Trusteeship/  
Agreement, but if it appeared that the  
suggested policy would command sufficient  
acquiescence in Palestine we could no  
doubt make interim arrangements in  
harmony with this policy before it was  
formally approved by the United Nations.

5. ~~The following~~ *below* paragraphs Nos. 6 to  
10 outline the essential features of  
the proposed Trusteeship Agreement.

6. Areas of local administration would  
be delimited in such a way as to include  
in each a substantial majority either of  
Arabs or of Jews. Neither the whole  
of the Arab territory nor the whole of  
the Jewish territory would necessarily  
be contiguous. A reasonably wide range  
of powers would be granted to the local  
Administrations. There would be  
safeguards/

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**FO 371 / 61718**



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14  
safeguards for the rights of the Jewish minority in Arab areas and of the Arab minority in Jewish areas.

7. "The British Delegation cannot accept the contention of the representatives of the Jewish Agency that the rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine as a whole should be determined by the Jews alone. Nor can they accept the demand of the Arab Delegations that all Jewish immigration into Palestine should cease forthwith. They do not contemplate either a settlement which would bring to an end the development of the Jewish National Home, or the admission of Jewish immigrants without reference to the effect of their entry on the rights and position of the non-Jewish population of the country. Any provisions made for future Jewish immigration must rest upon consideration for the well-being of Palestine as a whole."

"With this end in view the Trusteeship Agreement would provide for Jewish immigration, at a rate of 4,000 monthly, for a period of two years. This would guarantee the entry of approximately 100,000 additional Jewish immigrants. During the remainder of the period of Trusteeship, the continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined, with due regard to the principle of economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council; and in the event of disagreement the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations."

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Reference:-					
FO 371 / 61718					

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8. "Control over transfers of land, including the power to amend the existing Land Transfers Regulations, would be conferred on the local authorities."

9. "The High Commissioner would continue to exercise supreme legislative and executive authority. He would, however, endeavour to form an Advisory Council so composed as to include representatives, not only of the Arab and Jewish local Administrations, but also of labour <sup>Cultivators</sup> and other organised interests. Despite this composition, it is probable that voting in the Advisory Council would tend at first to follow communal lines. Since, however, the functions of the Council would be advisory and not legislative, the High Commissioner would be required to give due attention to the views of minorities.

On the conclusion of the Trusteeship Agreement the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner.

"During the period of trusteeship, the High Commissioner would introduce Palestinians into his Executive Council, and would progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members in that Council."

10. At the end of four years, a Constituent Assembly <sup>would</sup> ~~will~~ be elected. If the majority of its Jewish members and the majority of its Arab members <sup>failed</sup> ~~fail~~ to reach agreement on the terms of a Constitution, the Trusteeship Council would be asked to <sup>advise</sup> ~~decide~~ on the next move.

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(Caric only) Please pass to B.M.E.O. as my hel.  
NO. 137. 28/2

7.   $\frac{R.V.C.}{7.2}$

### Reference:-

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Cypher/OTP

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES AT

D. 10.00 p.m. February 7th, 1947.

SSSSS

[Washington only] MOST IMMEDIATE

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is summary of the proposals.

12.

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Reference:-

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2. Under our present proposals the people of the country would be associated with the Central Government from the outset and would be given a large measure of responsibility for local affairs. British participation in the government would not continue for longer than was necessary to effect the transition to complete independence, and this period of transition would be fixed at five years.

3. The proposals would be embodied in a Trusteeship Agreement. We believe that they are in conformity both with the obligations already resting upon us under the Mandate and with the provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Charter.

4. There would necessarily be an interval between the present discussions and the conclusion of a Trusteeship Agreement, but if it appeared that the suggested policy would command sufficient acquiescence in Palestine we could no doubt make interim arrangements in harmony with this policy before it was formally approved by the United Nations.

5. Paragraphs 6 to 10 below outline the essential features of the proposed Trusteeship Agreement.

6. Areas of local administration would be delimited in such a way as to include in each a substantial majority either of Arabs or of Jews. Neither the whole of the Arab territory nor the whole of the Jewish territory would necessarily be contiguous. A reasonably wide range of powers would be granted to the local Administrations. There would be safeguards for the rights of the Jewish minority in Arab areas and of the Arab minority in Jewish areas.

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FO 371 / 61748

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7. "The British Delegation cannot accept the contention of the representatives of the Jewish Agency that the rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine as a whole should be determined by the Jews alone. Nor can they accept the demand of the Arab Delegations that all Jewish immigration into Palestine should cease forthwith. They do not contemplate either a settlement which would bring to an end the development of the Jewish National Home, or the admission of Jewish immigrants without reference to the effect of their entry on the rights and position of the non-Jewish population of the country. Any provisions made for future Jewish immigration must rest upon consideration for the well-being of Palestine as a whole.

With this end in view the Trusteeship Agreement would provide for Jewish immigration, at a rate of 4,000 monthly, for a period of two years. This would guarantee the entry of approximately 100,000 additional Jewish immigrants. During the remainder of the period of Trusteeship, the continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined, with due regard to the principle of economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council; and in the event of disagreement the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations".

8. "Control over transfers of land, including the power to amend the existing Land Transfers Regulations, would be conferred on the local authorities".

9. "The High Commissioner would continue to exercise supreme legislative and executive authority. He would, /however,

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Reference:-  
FO 371 / 61748

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however, endeavour to form an Advisory Council so composed as to include representatives, not only of the Arab and Jewish local administrations, but also of labour, cultural and other organised interests. Despite this composition, it is probable that voting in the Advisory Council would tend at first to follow communal lines. Since, however, the functions of the Council would be advisory and not legislative, the High Commissioner would be required to give due attention to the views of minorities. On the conclusion of the Trusteeship Agreement, the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner."

"During the period of trusteeship, the High Commissioner would introduce Palestinians into his Executive Council, and would progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members in that Council".

10. At the end of four years, a Constituent Assembly would be elected. If the majority of its Jewish members and the majority of its Arab members failed to reach agreement on the terms of a Constitution, the Trusteeship Council would be asked to advise on the next move.

11. The object of the administering authority during the five years of Trusteeship would be to prepare Palestine for independence. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine themselves merely because Arabs and Jews cannot agree upon the means of sharing its government between them. They have therefore devised a plan which should give the two peoples an opportunity of demonstrating their ability to work together for the good of Palestine as a whole and so providing a stable foundation for an independent State.

[Cairo only] Please pass to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 137.

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Keep with pp  
WM 10/2

TOP SECRET

February, 1947.

PERSONAL

E 1231 / 2 / 31

INDEXED

Dear Archie,

You will by now have received my telegrams 1207 and 1208 about the new proposals for the settlement of the Palestine problem which we are putting to the Arabs and Jews. I think it may be helpful for your own background information for you to see the enclosed paper which the Colonial Secretary and I submitted to the Cabinet. It will give you a full idea of the reasons which prompted us to put forward this solution, and will strengthen your hand when you are talking to Marshall about it.

I shall be very grateful if you will keep this paper entirely to yourself and not show it to

His Excellency,  
The Right Honourable  
The Lord Inverchapel, K.C.M.G.

anyone/

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**Reference:-**

FO 371 6778



(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher message and unless it is marked O.T.P. (One Time Pad) the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

## OUTWARD TELEGRAM

F. 2780/  
CYPHER (TYPEX)

1231 2 31 O.D.

FROM: D.O.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

INDEXED

(Sent 5.0 p.m., 10th Feb., 1947.)

D.No. 120 SECRET

My telegram 4th February, D.No. 29 Saving, Top Secret.

A further informal meeting was held with representatives of Jewish Agency on 3rd February. Jews again circled round Partition without however making any positive proposals.

2. At a further meeting of Conference on 4th February, Arab delegates again maintained that their own proposals offered most just and practicable solution; They were prepared to continue discussions if we could assure them that there was no question of establishing a Jewish State in any part of Palestine and that a limit had now been reached to Jewish immigration.

3. United Kingdom Delegation undertook to formulate proposals and communicate them to Arab delegations and representatives of Jewish Agency in London. These proposals, of which summary is in my immediately following telegram, have now been communicated to the two sides as a basis for further negotiation on understanding that, if agreement can be reached on basis of them, we shall proceed to give effect to it.

4. If United Kingdom Delegation find that no (repeat no) agreement can be reached on this basis, they will report whether, in their judgment, a solution on these lines is likely to meet with any substantial measure of acquiescence from either of the two communities in Palestine. We shall then decide whether we should be justified in bringing such a scheme into operation on our own authority pending negotiation of a Trusteeship Agreement.

5. His Majesty's United Kingdom Ambassador, Washington, is being instructed to seek an early interview with United States Secretary of State, and to give him copy of these proposals for his personal information, and copies are also being communicated to Governments of Arab League.

Copy to:- Foreign Office

Cabinet Office

10 Downing Street.

Colonial Office

Sir David Scott  
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (6)  
Mr. H. Beeley

Mr. C.G. Eastwood  
Mr. D.F. Hubback  
(Room 55) (2)

Mr. T.L. Rowan

Mr. W.A.C. Mathieson

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2A

1251 2 51 R.D.

FROM: D.O.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 2.35 p.m., 10th Feb., 1947.)

**INDEXED**

D.No. 119 TOP SECRET

**Palestine.**

In connection with resumption of Palestine Conference, we have thought it well to try to elicit some indication of Palestine policy of United States Government, who have for a long time acted as if they had a right of intervention in Palestine affairs.

2. Recent history provides some grounds for uneasiness about United States attitude. Owing to United States intervention we have not been free to administer our mandate according to our own ideas, although we have endeavoured on our side to co-operate as closely as possible with United States. We were ready to consult with United States Government on the ten recommendations of United Kingdom-United States Committee of Inquiry (my telegram 24th April 1946 D.No.383) but consultations were prevented by President Truman's action in hastily endorsing one point and postponing consideration of other nine. We were also ready to adopt as basis of negotiations with Arabs and Jews report prepared by Meeting of United Kingdom-United States officials in London (for recommendations of report see statement by Lord President of Council in House of Commons on 31st July, 1946, Hansard Cols. 966/975.). But report was turned down by United States Government apparently almost without reason. President Truman later indicated that he favoured Zionist plan for partition but we did not know how strongly United States would be prepared to support this plan, nor what attitude they would adopt to other possible proposals.

3. His Majesty's United Kingdom Ambassador, Washington, was accordingly instructed to seek informal clarification of United States attitude, enquiring which solution United States Government preferred and how United States Delegation to United Nations Assembly would be likely to vote if we brought forward any other of proposals which had been canvassed.

4. Ambassador was also to represent our concern about support being displayed in United States for illegal immigration and other illegal activities, in form of collection of funds and printing of newspaper advertisements to finance such activities. He was to point out that, in addition to arousing Arab suspicions and opposition, such unchecked support by United States citizens and organisations might put United States Government in embarrassing position if and when Palestine question goes to U.N.O.

5. After informal discussions with State Department Ambassador has received memorandum to following effect. Begins:-

United States Government, considers that, for domestic and other reasons, it would be easier for them to support in United Nations and elsewhere solution of Palestine problem calling for

partition/

SPECIAL

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-2-

partition and setting up of a viable Jewish state than any other solution at present under consideration.

2. In case United Kingdom Government, after careful study and further discussion, should come to conclusion that partition solution would be unworkable and if it should be successful in working out in consultation with Arabs and Jews a solution, which in its opinion could successfully be put into effect, lying somewhere between partition plan and Morrison-Grady Cantonisation plan, United States Government would be disposed to give such a solution its support.

3. United States Government would find it somewhat difficult in view of attitude of United States public to give support to Cantonisation plan as proposed by Morrison-Grady, and much more difficult to support any solution which does not provide for entry in near future into Palestine of at least 100,000 displaced European Jews and for Jewish immigration at a reasonable rate thereafter. United States Government assumes that United Kingdom Government understands that United States Government could not participate in carrying out of any solution by armed force. President is planning in near future to recommend to Congress enactment of legislation which would permit immigration into United States of a substantial number of displaced persons in Europe. Such legislation, if enacted, should make it clear to both Arabs and Jews that United States is prepared on its part to accept an appropriate share of Jewish displaced persons.

4. United Kingdom Government has special knowledge derived from its many years' administration of Palestine and since it is engaging in direct conversations with Arabs and Jews, it should be in a better position than any other Government to sense kind of solution of Palestine problem which has best possibility of success. Furthermore, it will bear primary responsibility for putting into actual operation any plan for Palestine which might be adopted. It would seem, therefore, that decision as to solution of Palestine problem must rest with United Kingdom Government.

5. United States Government, while realising that United Kingdom Government alone can decide course which it should follow, would regret any decision of United Kingdom Government to turn mandate over to General Assembly without recommendations. Such a course might well lead to much confusion and violence in Palestine and elsewhere in Near East. Ends.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Sir David Scott  
Mr. J.P.G.Finch (6)  
Mr. H. Beeley

Cabinet Office

Mr. C.G.Eastwood  
Mr. D.F.Hubback (Room 55)  
(2)

10 Downing Street

Mr. T.L.Rowan

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO 371 / 61748

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With the Compliments of the  
Under-Secretary of State for Dominion  
Affairs.

11 FEB 1947

## OUTWARD TELEGRAM

WARNING: (Any telegraphic retransmission of this secret cypher telegram must be prepared in a one-time system.)

F.2780/  
CYPHER (PUBLEX)

E 1231 / 2 B1

O.D.

FROM: D.O.

INDEXED

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 6.35 p.m., 10th Feb., 1947.)

D.No. 121 SECRET

My immediately preceding telegram. Palestine.

Following is summary of United Kingdom proposals. Begins.

Document begins by reciting our obligations under Mandate, and points out that during last 25 years we have done our best to further legitimate aspirations of Jews without prejudicing interests of Arabs. We have not, however, been able to "secure the development of self-governing institutions" in accordance with Mandate because it has not been possible to find a basis of co-operation acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. A time has come when development in direction of self-government can no longer be delayed. Forms of government must now be established which have their roots in people of country and which offer a prospect of full independence within a reasonably short period.

2. Under our present proposals people of country would be associated with Central Government from outset and would be given a large measure of responsibility for local affairs. United Kingdom participation in government would not continue for longer than was necessary to effect transition to complete independence, and this period of transition would be fixed at five years.

3. Proposals would be embodied in a Trusteeship Agreement. We believe that they are in conformity both with obligations already resting upon us under Mandate and with provisions of Article 76 of United Nations Charter.

4. There would necessarily be an interval between present discussions and conclusion of a Trusteeship Agreement, but if it appeared that suggested policy would command sufficient acquiescence in Palestine we could no doubt make interim arrangements in harmony with this policy before it was formally approved by United Nations.

5. Essential features of proposed Trusteeship Agreement are:-

- (a) Areas of local administration would be delimited in such a way as to include in each a substantial majority either of Arabs or of Jews. Neither whole of Arab territory nor whole of Jewish territory would necessarily be contiguous. A reasonably wide range of powers would be granted to local Administrations. There would be safeguards for rights of Jewish minority in Arab areas and of Arab minority in Jewish areas.
- (b) United Kingdom Delegation cannot accept contention of representatives of Jewish Agency that rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine as a whole should be determined by Jews alone. Nor can they accept demand of Arab Delegations that all Jewish immigration into Palestine should/

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	1	1	1	1

Reference:-

FO

371

61748

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1	2	3	4	5	6
		1			
				2	

- Reference:- **FO 371 61728**

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- 6178

Sir D. Scott  
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (6)  
Mr. H. Beeley  
Mr. C.G. Eastwood  
Mr. D.F. Hubback (Room 55) (2)  
Mr. T.L. Rowan

Mr. C. G. Eastwood  
Mr. D. F. Hubback (Room 55) (2)  
Mr. T. L. Rowan

10 Downing St.



En Clair

123/ 2 3/

123/ 2 3/ FILES

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell.  
No. 384.

INDEXED

11th February 1947.

D. 6.00. p.m.  
11th February 1947.  
R. 7.43. p.m.  
11th February 1947.

IMMEDIATE

Your telegram 296 received without any paragraph 3 but with a paragraph four. AS we are asked to repeat paragraphs one to three to B.M.E.O. please elucidate.

RECEIVED  
11 FEB 1947  
11 FEB 1947

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO

371

61748

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With the Compliments of the  
Under Secretary of State for Dominion

Affairs 15 FEB 1947  
(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher message and unless it is marked O.T.P. (One Time Pad) the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

## OUTWARD TELEGRAM

INDEXED

F.  
CYPHER (TYPEX)

FROM: D.O.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

1231 2 11  
19 FEB 1947

(Sent 9.50 p.m., 14th Feb., 1947.)

IMPORTANT  
D.No. 146 SECRET

My telegram 10th February, D.No. 121. Palestine.

Zionist representatives and Arab Delegates have declined to accept our proposals as basis for further negotiations.

2. Zionists object on ground that our proposals would be likely to lead to independence of Palestine as a unitary state with Jews in a permanent minority. Arabs fear that establishment of local Government areas enjoying a measure of autonomy would lead to partition and they are opposed to further Jewish immigration.

3. Jewish counter proposal is that Jewish community in Palestine should be allowed to build up its strength under British protection in accordance with pre-1939 interpretation of mandate. In face of our refusal to undertake this continuing responsibility in present circumstances they are willing to consider proposals for partition, but it is clear that, even if we were willing to negotiate on basis of partition, there would be no prospect of agreement on size of Jewish state.

4. Arab Delegations stand by their September proposals (my telegram 25th September, 1946 D.No. 875) and appear to think that, if we will not negotiate on that basis, we should leave Palestine.

5. We think that our latest proposals have found some favour with non-Zionist Jews, but mood of Jews and Arabs in Palestine is such that, in our judgment, there is no prospect of acquiescence in these proposals and we have reached conclusion that it is impossible for us alone to arrive at peaceful settlement in Palestine on any basis. We have therefore come to conclusion that best course is to submit whole problem of Palestine to U.N.O. Assembly, putting before them all the various solutions which have been proposed but ourselves making no recommendations. We see no prospect of getting problem considered by the United Nations before next regular session of Assembly in September.

6. Announcement of this decision will not only have advantage of reducing risk that some other State may bring Palestine situation to agenda of Security Council, but may have a restraining influence on both Jews and Arabs in Palestine. We therefore contemplate announcement to this effect in Parliament early next week, probably Tuesday 18th February.

Copy to:-

Dominions Office  
Foreign Office

Cabinet Office

Colonial Office  
No. 10 Downing St.

Special Limited Distribution  
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (6)  
Mr. C.W. Baxter  
Mr. C.G. Eastwood  
Mr. D.F. Hubback (Rm 55) (2)  
Mr. Trafford-Smith  
Mr. T.L. Rowan

SPECIAL

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO 371 61748

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**Registry**  
**No.** E 1231/2/31

*Draft.*

~~Top Secret.~~  
~~Secret.~~  
~~Confidential.~~  
~~Restricted.~~  
~~Open.~~

Telegram. to Paris  
No. 372. ✓  
(Date) Feb 17.

*Repeat to :—*

Bagdad 146 ✓  
Beirut 105 ✓  
Damascus 98 ✓  
Jeddah 80 ✓  
Amman 65. ✓

~~En Clair.~~  
Code. Enclair.  
Cypher.

*Distribution :—*

*Copies to :—*

**OUT FILE** *F. O.,*  
1743

Despatched 3 48 M.

IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED

Your telegram No 384 [of February 11]

[British proposals for Palestine]

~~Do my lib: no: 296, for paras 1 & 3 please  
Paragraph three was for Washington  
read para  
why. and read as follows:—~~

~~You shd. seek an early  
interview with Marshall and  
give him a copy of my immediate  
Memorandum for his personal  
information.~~

In my tel: no. 296 for "please  
pass paras 1 to 3 to B.M.E.O." please  
read "please pass <sup>(paras 1 & 2)</sup> to B.M.E.O." Para.  
3 was addressed to Washington only.

12-14h

1	2	3	4	5	6
1					
2					

Reference:-

6778

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OUT FILE

E1231/2/31

RESTRICTED

En Clair

FILES

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 372  
17th February, 1947. D. 3.48 p.m. 17th February, 1947.

Repeated to Bagdad No. 146  
Beirut No. 105  
Damascus No. 78  
Jedda No. 80  
Amman No. 65.

0 0 0 0

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

Your telegram No. 384 [of February 11th]

[British proposals for Palestine].

In my telegram No. 296 for "please pass paragraphs 1 to 3 to B.M.E.O." please read "please pass paragraphs 1 and 2 to B.M.E.O." Paragraph 3 was addressed to Washington only].

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO

371

61748


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1231

2

31



INDEXED

32

En Clair

FILESFROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICESir H. Stonehewer Bird  
No. 157

D. 8.00 a.m. 20th February, 1947

20th February, 1947

R. 9.45 a.m. 20th February, 1947

FFFF

Encl 1/2/47

Your telegram No. 146 not understood. Is it  
rightly addressed?

[Note by Communications Department: Telegram under  
reference was correctly addressed to Cairo repeated  
Bagdad etc.]

1
2
3
4
5
6

Reference:-

FO

371

61748

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry  
No.

E1231/2/31

Draft.

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

Telegram. *Bagdad*

No. *166*

(Date) *21.2.47*

Repeat to :—

~~En Clair.~~  
Code.  
Cypher.

Distribution :—

*Files*

Copies to :—

OUT FILE

F. O.,

194

Despatched

M.

*Your telegram no. 157*  
*My telegram no. 296* <sup>TO</sup> ~~is~~  
*same was identical with no.*  
*113 to you.*

*H.B. 21/2*

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:—

FO 371 / 61748

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OUT FILE

OUTWARD TELEGRAM  
(E 1231/2/31)

En clair

FILES

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAGDAD

No. 166  
21st February, 1947

D. 7.49 p.m. 21st February, 1947

aaaaaaa

Your telegram No. 157.

My telegram No. 296 to Cairo was identical with  
No. 113 to you.

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO

371

61748

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With the Compliments of the

Under Secretary of State for Dominion

Affairs. 9 MAR 1947

(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher message and unless it is marked O.T.P. (One Time Pad) the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

## OUTWARD TELEGRAM

F 2780/  
CYPHER (TYPEX)

INDEXED

O.D.

FROM: D.O.

TO: CANADA (GOVT)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

ER 11 / 2 / 81

10 MAR 1947

(Sent 5.15 p.m., 8th Mar., 1947.)

D.No. 227 SECRET

My telegram 14th February D.No. 146. Palestine.

In view of importance of achieving early settlement of Palestine problem we have been considering possible means by which consideration by United Nations Assembly might be expedited. We do not consider it practicable to suggest summoning a special session of Assembly and Palestine question will not therefore come before Assembly until its next session in September; even then Assembly, which will have many other problems on its hands, will probably be unable to reach any definite conclusion unless preparatory work has been done.

2. Course which commends itself to us is that Secretary General should summon ad hoc Committee as soon as possible to do this preparatory work and to report to Assembly. Permanent United Kingdom Representative to United Nations has ascertained, in private conversation with Secretary General, that latter would be prepared to propose this; we have therefore authorised Sir A. Cadogan, when formally requesting him to place Palestine problem on Assembly agenda, to suggest summoning ad hoc committee on above lines.

3. As regards composition of committee, our preliminary view is that it should consist of representatives of 5 permanent members of Security Council and of Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Brazil, but we have not yet decided whether this should be formally suggested to Secretary General. On general grounds it seems obvious that permanent members of Security Council should be represented and they will probably expect this. Choice of other three is based on following considerations:-

- (a) geographical distribution;
- (b) they are, in our view, likely to be neutral and open-minded on Palestine issue;
- (c) their nomination would not expose us to charge of trying to "pack" committee.

4. Secretary General has suggested informally that Jewish and Arab representatives should be members of Committee. There is in our view, strong objection to inclusion of Jewish representatives, which would set dangerous precedent for participation of non-Governmental organisations in committees of United Nations. Clearly, however, if Jewish representatives are excluded, Arab States should also be excluded. On these grounds and as proposed Committee would be principally concerned with examination of facts, it seems more appropriate for both Arabs and Jews to be invited to give evidence through representatives with special knowledge of Palestine, who could, if desired, be available for consultation throughout proceedings.

Copy to: /

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

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Reference:-  
FO 371 / 61748



36

-2-

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Sir D. Scott  
Mr. J.P.G.Finch (8)  
Mr. H. Beeley

Colonial Office

Mr. Trafford Smith

Cabinet Office

Mr. D.F.Hubback (Rm 55)  
(2)

Mr. S.E.V.Luke

No. 10 Downing St.

Mr. T.L.Rowan

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO 371 / 61748

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With the Compliments of the  
Under-Secretary of State for Dominion  
Affairs:

23 MAR 1947

GUARD

# OUTWARD TELEGRAM

E 1231/2/21

25 MAR 1947

F.2780/21  
CYPHER (TYPEX)

O.D.

FROM: D.O.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 6.20 p.m., 21st Mar., 1947.)

D.No. 268 SECRET GUARD

My telegram 8th March D.No. 227 paragraph 2. Palestine.

Secretary General of United Nations has now consulted representatives of French, Chinese, Soviet and United States Governments about proposal to set up ad hoc Committee. Chinese Government have approved, and French Government are ready to accept the procedure. Soviet delegate has approved on basis that Sweden should be substituted for Netherlands on Committee. United States State Department, however, are doubtful of legal validity of proposal.

2. Secretary General has informed us that, to ensure that status of proposed committee could not be challenged in Assembly, he would propose to telegraph all members of United Nations, informing them of what is proposed and asking whether they agree; he would not proceed to set up Committee until he had obtained agreement of requisite majority of member States.

3. State Department doubt, however, whether result of this could be interpreted as conferring Assembly's sanction on proposed Committee and have informed us unofficially and in confidence, that they are thinking of suggesting special Assembly to establish Committee. We had already suggested this informally to Secretary General, who strongly objected on grounds of expense and, in fact, himself mentioned as an alternative the possibility of summoning ad hoc Committee. We are requesting His Majesty's United Kingdom Ambassador, Washington, to inform State Department that we are ready to agree to which ever of the two procedures commands general support. It is, however, essential to secure that preparatory fact-finding work should be done before Assembly meets in September, otherwise Assembly will almost certainly be unable to reach decision on Palestine this year.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Cabinet Office  
Colonial Office  
Cabinet Office  
No. 10 Downing Street

Sir D. Scott  
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (8)  
Mr. H. Beeley  
Mr. D.F. Hubback (Rm 55)(2)  
Mr. Trafford Smith  
Mr. S.E.V. Luke  
Mr. T.L. Rowan

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1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-  
**FO 371**  
**61718**

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43

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 1252

10 FEB

38

Registry  
Number

E1252/2/46.

TELEGRAM FROM

No. M. Talbot  
Beirut

Dated

82.

Received  
in Registry7 Feb 1947  
10 Feb 1947Palestine Conference

Refers: F.O. Cd 957 (E1061/2/31). Discusses the securing of maximum publicity in the Arab world for the attitude of H.M.G. re Palestine, makes three suggestions.

Last Paper.

1231

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Our present proposals for Palestine cannot yet be described as a decision. We have already communicated a summary of them to the Arab governments. We should certainly act in accordance with Mr. Talbot's other suggestions when a decision is imminent; but we had better not commit ourselves too deeply at this stage to the present plan.

H. Bealey 117

12

The M.E. posts have been kept fully inf. <sup>a</sup>  
No further action necessary.

RG  
22/

(Action  
completed.)

SEA 125/2

(Index.)

5/6/48

Next Paper.

E1257

30471 F.O.P.

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

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FO 371 / 61748

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1	2	3	4	5	6
	1			2	

Reference:-

**FO 371 / 61728**



44

1947

E

E 1257

10 FEB

PALESTINE

Registry Number E1257/2/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

London General  
Washington  
837  
8 Feb 1947  
10 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference  
Refer 70 of 1207 (E1231/2/31). As General  
Marshall and Mr. Acheson were not available  
today Mr. Acheson gave contents of  
your telegram no 1208 (E1231/2/31) to the Director  
of the Office of Near Eastern and African  
Affairs.

Last Paper.

1257

References.

(Minutes)

1412  
N. American Press.

773  
111  
12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

ALSO

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

46/114  
11/10

Next Paper.

E1322

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO 371 / 61718

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E 1257

10 FEB

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

၆၆၆၆၆၆၆၆

Your telegram No. 1207.

As General Marshall and Mr. Acheson were not available today His Majesty's Minister gave contents of your telegram No. 1208 to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

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### Reference:

FO 37 6778



45

1947

E

E 1322

12

42

PALESTINE

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 1322/2/31

Sir N. Brook

Cabinet Office

to Mr. Henrich

7 Feb 1947

12 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference.

Suggests that document P.C. (A/P) 5) approved by the Cabinet should be sent to the Arabs and the Jews with covering notes in terms of attached drafts.

Last Paper.

1257

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

app. Sir N. Brook  
Cabinet Office  
Feb 7.

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

J.C.M. 20/2

R.H. 26/48

Next Paper.

1328

(Minutes.)

H.B. 19/2

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Reference:-

FO 371/61748

CABINET OFFICE

E 1322

WHITEHALL 5422

7th February, 1947.

Dear Henniker,

Palestine

After consultation with officials of your Department and the Colonial Office, I suggest that the document which the Cabinet approved this morning should be sent to the Arabs and the Jews with covering notes in terms of the attached drafts.

.....

I should be grateful if you would submit these to the Foreign Secretary. If he and the Colonial Secretary agree with the terms of the drafts, I doubt whether it is necessary for us to meet, as you suggested, at 6.0 p.m.

I am writing in similar terms to Edmonds at the Colonial Office.

Yours sincerely,

Norman Brook.

J.P.E.C. Henniker, Esq., M.C.,  
Foreign Office.

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO 371 / 61748

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44  
For communication to the Arab Delegations

(Paper to be circulated by Secretariat, Palestine Conference)

SECRET

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

P.C.(A)(P.) 5

PALESTINE CONFERENCE, 1946/47

Note by the British Delegation

The plan outlined in the annexed memorandum is submitted by the British Delegation as a basis for further negotiation on the future of Palestine.

The British Delegation are ready to meet the Arab Delegations at their earliest convenience to discuss the proposals in this memorandum.

These proposals are being communicated simultaneously to the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

St. James' Palace, S.W.1.

7th February, 1947.

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	2			

Reference:-  
**FO 371 / 61728**

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45  
For communication to the Jewish Agency

(Letter to be signed by Private Secretary, Colonial  
Office)

SECRET

Dear Mr. Linton,

The Secretary of State desires me to send to you, to be laid before the Executive of the Jewish Agency, the enclosed copies of a memorandum outlining proposals for the future government of Palestine.

This memorandum is put forward as a basis for further negotiation.

The Colonial Secretary and Mr. Bevin are ready to meet the representatives of the Jewish Agency at their earliest convenience to discuss the proposals outlined in this memorandum.

These proposals are being communicated simultaneously to the Arab Delegations now in London.

Yours sincerely,

The Secretary,  
Jewish Agency for Palestine,  
77, Great Russell Street.

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1	1			2	

Reference:-  
**FO 371/61748**

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OUT FILE *for Entw.*  
Foreign Office, S.W. 7.

7th February, 1947.

Dear Brook,

Thank you for your letter of today in which you enclosed draft covering notes to the Arabs and Jews, under which the documents which the Cabinet approved this morning was to be sent to them.

I am just writing to confirm that the Secretary of State approved the terms of these notes.

I am sending a copy of this to Edmonds at the Colonial Office.

(Sgd.) J. P. E. C. HENNIKER

Sir Norman Brook, K.C.B.,  
Cabinet Offices.

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-  
FO 371 / 61748

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46

E

1947

PALESTINE

E 1328

12 FEB

47

Registry  
Number

E1328/2/31.

FROM

U.K. Del.

No.

Palestine Conf.

Dated

P.C. (A/P) 6.

Received

in Registry

10 Feb 1947

12 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference.

Note by Arab Delegation.

Refers P.C. (A/P) 5 of Feb 7 from U.K.  
Del. Transmits Arab reply to proposed  
plan.

Last Paper.

1922

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

E. Dept. Comps.

Amman

Beirut

Bagdad

Cairo

Brussels

Teddah

W. Yon

Damascus

FORU

Feb

(Action  
completed.)

El Mro

(Index)

5/10/48

Next Paper.

1930

(Minutes.)

H.B. 19/2

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Reference:-

FO

371

61748



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49

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2

Reference:-

FO 371/61748

- 1 -



50

2. During the last twenty-five years, self-government and independence were denied to Palestine, thus unjustly sacrificing their natural rights to Zionist designs. The Arabs regret that their right to self-government was so long delayed and that it still is in suspense simply because an imposed body of foreigners dictates that it should be so.

3. The Arab Delegations believe that, if the right of the Arabs of Palestine to independence is not to be withheld there is no need for Trusteeship. Palestine should be declared independent forthwith and the United Nations could be notified to that effect. Hence the question of Trusteeship, which the Arabs reject, does not arise.

4. The Arab Delegations, re-affirming their wish to see Palestine as one whole, consider that the wide range of powers given to local administrations, including legislative, administrative and financial, is another guise for partition of Palestine into smaller units. The Arab Delegations believe that the safeguards referred to in paragraph 8 could be guaranteed to the Jews without dissecting the country into divisions. They reject partition in all its forms.

5. The Arab Delegations note that the protection of Arab lands is neglected, and land transfers left to the mercy of local authorities. This simply means that many small Arab cultivators are made landless by Jewish financial pressure. The Arab Delegations consider the question of land transfer as a major social problem besides its political significance and they would expect a socialist government to protect rather than jeopardise the source of livelihood of the Arabs.

6. The paragraphs on immigration are very disappointing indeed to the Arab Delegations, not only because they are a flagrant violation of Arab rights and position in Palestine, but because they show a complete disregard by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the strong Arab arguments on the subject. It seems as

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Reference: **FO 371 61718**

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though the British Government have never heard of the continued and sharp protests of the Arab world, Governments and peoples, against the Anglo-American Committee's report last year and the condemnation of this report by the Arab League Council, at its extraordinary session in Bludan, Syria, mainly because it proposed the introduction of 100,000 immigrants into Palestine. The Arab Delegations feel duty bound to remind His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that this proposal for immigration cannot well go with Anglo-Arab friendship. We feel that His Majesty's Government is going a long way towards appeasing the Jewish terrorists and American point of view at the expense of Arab rights and Anglo-Arab friendship. The Arab Delegations wish to reaffirm their view that Palestine is already overcrowded and account should be taken of its rapidly increasing population. Moreover, the Jews have already increased by enforced immigration to such an extent as to endanger the very existence of the Arabs in Palestine and the vital interests of the Arab States. The Arab Delegations, therefore, cannot accept at all the proposals for further immigration which is contrary to the new decision taken by the United Nations Assembly, last December. It is a matter of fact that further immigration is very much like adding fuel to the fire in the Arab World and we hope that this fact will be appreciated by His Majesty's Government.

## CONCLUSIONS

The Arab Delegations affirm that no solution is workable in Palestine which does not win Arab confidence and recognise Arab rights which have been so far withheld. The Arabs demand:-

- A. Immediate independence of an undivided and unpartitioned Palestine.
- B. The stoppage of immigration.
- C. Protection of Arab Lands.



47

E

E 1330

1947

PALESTINE

12 FEB

52

Registry Number E 1330/2/31

TELEGRAM FROM Sir A Kirkbride

No. Amman

Dated H H.

Received in Registry 11 Feb 1947

12 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference

King Abdullah has received message from HAJ AMIN HUSSEINI asking for his immediate intervention in view of H H G Statement on Palestine, King replied suggesting that the question of future action appeared to be one for consideration by the Arab League.

(Minutes.)

H.B. 20/12

Last Paper.

1328

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

8 E M 20/2

(Index)

5/6/48

Next Paper.

E 1330

30471 F.O.P

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Reference: FO 371/61748

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E 13306

53

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

CYPHER/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride.  
No. 44.

D: 2.05 p.m. 11th February, 1947.

11th February, 1947.

R: 3.50 p.m. 11th February, 1947.

Repeated to: Beirut,  
Cairo,  
Damascus,  
Jerusalem Saving.

@@@ @@@ @@@

IMMEDIATE

Foreign Office please repeat to Bagdad, Jedda  
British Middle East Office Cairo as my telegram No. 4,  
6 and 4 respectively.

SECRET

Palestine Conference.

King Abdullah has received message from Haj Amith  
[sic] Husseini asking for his immediate intervention in  
view of your statement on Palestine. King replied suggesting  
that the question of future action appeared to be one for  
consideration by the Arab League.

[Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and British Middle East Office  
Cairo under Foreign Office Nos. 128, 61 and 151 respectively.]

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

1. Mr. Jones  
2. Enters.

10/10/2

55

Secretary of State.

INDEXED

I attach a note of Mr. Beeley's conversation with Dr. Jamali. In view of this he does not think that the suggestion that you might see Faris Bey is worth pursuing.

He asked me to let you know as well that he today had lunch with Mr. Jones of the American Embassy whom he has been keeping fully informed of the progress of negotiations. Mr. Jones regards General Marshall's statements on Palestine at the press conference yesterday as a personal triumph for himself and the moderate line taken by the General is undoubtedly in a large part due to the full information he is getting from here. I attach the Times report of what General Marshall said.

Mr. Jones, however, pointed out that he thought that the Zionist reaction to our new proposals when they were known in the United States would be very violent and the administration would be under the heaviest pressure to make some statement hostile to the proposals. Mr. Jones thought we ought to do something quickly to try to keep General Marshall to the line he is at present pursuing and Mr. Beeley is accordingly over the weekend preparing a telegram from you to General Marshall to try to prevent him coming out with any critical statement. He will have it ready by Monday morning.

Mr. Beeley has also seen the representative of the Arab News Agency here who was about to telegraph out to the Arab States that the Arab delegates here were inclined to reject the new British plan. This, if reported in newspapers in the Arab countries, would have made it more difficult for the Arabs to continue negotiations and Mr. Beeley therefore induced him to say instead that the Arab States were at present considering whether to continue negotiations.

John. H. H. H.

8th February, 1947.

J. H. H.

Copy attached

J. H. H.

Good

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Reference:-

FO

371

61748

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E 1353

13 FEB

56

I called on Dr. Jamali after lunch today, and urged him to use his influence with the Arab delegates to induce them to discuss our new proposals in detail next week. I said I was sure he would agree that the Secretary of State had shown great understanding of their point of view. (Dr. Jamali at once agreed with this). The Secretary of State believed in the value of negotiation even if it did not result in agreement. It was important that we should part in a friendly atmosphere, and that nothing should be done which would impair the chances of a settlement at a later stage.

2. Dr. Jamali then explained the message which the Arab Delegations had communicated to the British Delegation through Mr. Armstrong this morning (copy attached). Some of them, he said, had wanted to send us a formal rejection of our proposals and return home without meeting us again. Others had urged that further meetings might be useful, and the decision which they had reached was a compromise. They therefore proposed to send us a short note on Monday morning, saying that our new proposals were quite unacceptable, but that they were ready to meet us again if we wished.

3. Dr. Jamali had himself been deputed to draft this note. I tried unsuccessfully to persuade him that the Arabs would be better advised to attend a meeting of the Conference and present their reply verbally. This he said was impossible in view of the decision which they had taken at their meeting this morning. But he


agreed/

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agreed to try to make the note less negative than had originally been intended. It will probably end by saying that the Arabs are ready, provided we understand their views as expressed in the earlier paragraphs of the note, to meet us whenever we desire.

4. Dr. Jamali agreed, so far as he was concerned, to a meeting on Monday afternoon, and I think there will be no difficulty in arranging this, *after we have received their note, which is promised for Monday morning.*

*H Beekun*  
8th February, 1947.

*FOB*

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INDEXED

Our written reply to your last Memorandum will be sent to you in a day or two. If the British Delegation presume after reading it that it is necessary to have a further meeting, the Arab Delegation will be ready to respond.



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Minutes.

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Extract from "The Times" of INDEXED  
February 8th, 1947

(Extract from report of statement  
made by General Marshal at Press  
Conference.)

The Secretary said he did not wish to say much about Palestine. The discussions in London he described as critical ones concerning which the United States was being kept fully informed. It was hoped in the United States that the parties would settle down to a pacific settlement of the vexatious issues involved. The United States felt deeply concerned about the situation in Palestine itself, but here again he thought there was confusion in the public mind about the purposes of the British Government. The belief existed that the steps recently taken were meant to be strong military tactics, but he did not believe this to be the case.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Reference:-

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371

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E 1385

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1947

PALESTINE

13 FEB

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E1385/2/31

U.K. Del

Palestine Conference

PC (WP) 9 mtg

30 Jan 1947

13 Feb 1947

Palestine ConferenceCorrigendaTransmit corrections on paper under  
ref. re Remarks attributed to H.E. HAKKI  
REY etc.

Last Paper.

1358

References.

(Minutes.)

MB. 21/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

E. Dept. Copy.

Amman

Beirut

Bagdad

Sakko

Cairo

Adda

Damascus

N. Hon

FORN Being done

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

J.B.M. 12/2

R.B. 3/6/48

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1386

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Reference:-

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61748

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CONFIDENTIAL

P.C.(A)(P) 9th Meeting

E 1385

13 FEB

COPY NO.

61  
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PALESTINE CONFERENCE, 1946-47

Notes of Ninth Meeting held at 1, Carlton Gardens, London,  
S.W.1., on Thursday, 30th January, 1947, at 3.0 p.m.

CORRIGENDA

Remarks attributed to H.E. Hakki Bey

Page 11:

Delete from "but it was" in line 2 to "both must be  
considered", in line 6 and substitute:-

"But if peace could not be maintained under an arrangement  
which did not satisfy the ambitions of the Jews, still  
less could peace be maintained under an arrangement  
whereby those ambitions were satisfied at the expense  
of the Arabs. Support of the United States of America  
might perhaps be obtained by satisfying the ambitions of  
the Jews, but it must be realised on the other hand  
that, by so doing, not only would Arab sympathy be  
alienated, but also the friendship of the whole Moslem  
world which was composed of several hundred million  
people."

Line 9

Delete "Outside Palestine" and substitute:-

"Scattered all over the world".

Page 12, Line 6

After "trouble" insert "In most countries of Europe"

Line 7

After collaborate" insert "as good citizens"

Line 8

Delete "The Arabs" and substitute:-

"their compatriots".

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**FO 371/61748**

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Remarks attributed to H.E. Dr Jamali

Page 20, lines 13 and 14

Delete from "Modern Zionists" in line 12 to "times"  
in line 13 and substitute:-  
"modern Zionists of today and the Revisionists of  
25 years ago"

No other amendments to the above minutes having  
been received, it is requested that the copies of the  
Draft Minutes in your possession should be regarded as  
FINAL copies.

St. James's Palace, S.W.1.  
12th FEBRUARY, 1947.

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**FO 371 / 61748**

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E

E 1386

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PALESTINE

13

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 1386/2/31.

U.K. Delegation

Palestine Conference

PC (A.P.) 11 mtg

12 Feb 1947

18 Feb 1947

Palestine ConferenceTransmit notes of 11th meeting. Hld  
on Wednesday Feb 12th

Last Paper.

1385-

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

C. Depts Boars.

Amman

Beirut

Bagdad

R.M.O

Bairo

Feddah

Damascus

W'yon

FORU

(Action  
completed)

E.M. 21/2

(Index.)

M. 5/6/48

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CONFIDENTIAL

PC(A)(P) 11th Meeting (DRAFT)

E 1386

13 FEB

COPY NO. 56

PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946-47

UNITED KINGDOM - ARAB DELEGATIONS

Notes of Eleventh Meeting held at 1 Carlton Gardens, London,  
S.W.1., on Wednesday 12th February, 1947, at 11.0 a.m.

PRESENT:-

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The Rt. Hon. A. Creech Jones, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for the Colonies

Sir Norman Brook  
Secretary of the Cabinet

FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Robert Howe  
Mr C.W. Baxter  
Mr H. Beeley  
Mr J.P.E.C. Henniker-Major

COLONIAL OFFICE

Mr J.M. Martin  
Sir Douglas Harris  
Mr E.R. Edmonds

ARAB DELEGATIONS

EGYPT

His Excellency Abdel Fattah Amr Pasha

His Excellency Abdel Rahman Hakki Bey

M. Abdel Moneim Mostafa

M. Mohamed Mostafa Yassin

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IRAQ

His Excellency Dr Fadhil Jamali  
M. Arkhan Abadi  
M. Bashaian

LEBANON

His Excellency Camille Bey Chamoun  
M. Victor Khoury  
M. Nadim Dimechkie

PALESTINE ARABS

Jamal Bey Hussein  
Dr Hussein Khalidi  
Emile Effendi Ghoury  
Sami Effendi Taher  
Dr Omar al Khalil  
Yusuf Effendi Sahyoun

SAUDI-ARABIA

His Excellency Sheikh Hafiz Wahba

SYRIA

His Excellency Dr Najib Armenazi

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TRANSJORDAN

His Highness Abdul Majid Haidar  
Hani Bey Hashim  
His Excellency Dr Fawzi Bey Mulki

YEMEN

His Royal Highness Seif-al-Islam Abdullah  
Dr Adnan Tarcici

M. Najib Abu Ezz-ed-Din (Interpreter)

CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Mr E.A. Armstrong	Secretary
Mr C.A. Gault	Assistant Secretaries
Mr W.A.C. Mathieson	
Mr S. Naish	Social Secretary

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MR. BEVIN said that the Arab reply had been received and had been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government. Unfortunately, it seemed that agreement was as far off as ever. The reply made no attempt to meet His Majesty's Government. He wished to take up in particular one point - that the Arab States disclaimed any responsibility for the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate. There had been Arab States members of the League of Nations and there were now Arab States members of the United Nations. None of the Arab States in the League had protested against the Balfour Declaration. They had accepted the League and its obligations. One of these was the Palestine Mandate which had now been handed over to the United Nations. His Majesty's Government had therefore had some grounds for assuming that the Arab States had accepted the Declaration and the Mandate.

A second point was that the 1939 White Paper which had been accepted by the British Parliament of the day, had been applied in Palestine at great cost to Britain, and Britain had the right, therefore, to ask for the removal of the restrictions of the 1939 White Paper and, if necessary, for a revision of the Mandate. The present state of affairs could not go on. His Majesty's Government had worked hard to find an alternative to the White Paper and the Mandate, but they had received no help from either Arabs or Jews. A settlement was essential for the ultimate good of the Middle East. The problem could be solved without injury to Arab opinion or disturbing the existing friendly relations between the Arab States and Britain. Since he had been in office he

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had tried his utmost to bring Jews and Arabs together. But they had refused to meet. He reminded the Arab delegates that if the problem of Palestine was referred to the United Nations, both sides, Jews and Arabs, would have to be heard. A settlement "out of court" might be better than recourse to the United Nations. In the United Nations, His Majesty's Government would be unable to mediate as they were doing now. If the two sides should feel able to meet by themselves, His Majesty's Government would not stand in their way. A settlement by force was out of the question. Surely the statesmanship of the two parties themselves should make a solution possible. He realised that the dispute was not merely a political one, but was complicated by religious, historical and other circumstances. He would welcome direct negotiations between the two parties, for he wished to see this, the last outstanding problem in the Middle East, cleared up.

H.E. DR. JAMALI, referring to the position of the Arab States in the League of Nations, said that two Arab States had been members of the League - Iraq and Egypt. They had entered the League on the basis of the Covenant, but they did not hold themselves responsible for wrong applications of the Covenant. Iraq had always felt that the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate were contradictions of paragraph 4 of Article XXII of the Covenant. The Iraq Governments and the people of Iraq had consistently opposed the Balfour Declaration.

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H.E. HAKKI BEY confirmed that Egypt too had always opposed the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate. In 1937 when Egypt joined the League and again in 1938 she had expressed her opposition to the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate.

DR JAMALI continued by asking how Arabs could be held responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East while they were the subject of aggression by the Jews. The Arabs had remained peaceful and passive under this aggression; but they could not accept any settlement of the Palestine problem which justified what they regarded as an aggression. They could not compromise between peace and war or between right and wrong. No compromise was in fact possible. The British plan was not even a compromise; it was surrender to the Zionists; a gradual yielding no doubt, but this coincided with Zionist aims as expressed by Dr. Weizmann before the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry in Jerusalem. Dr Weizmann had said that the Zionists wanted 100,000 immigrants, but not all at once. They would be satisfied with a gradual entry of these immigrants into Palestine. The British plan had no finality and there was no guarantee that in a few years' time the Jews would not put forward further demands with the object of securing a Jewish State. The Arabs had exercised the utmost restraint.

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On the question of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, H.E. CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUN said that it was very questionable whether the British Government had any right to make the Declaration. Many statements had been made by British spokesmen in the period 1916-19 that the future of Palestine should be decided by the people of that country in accordance with their natural right to self-determination. The British Government had no power to promise Palestine to the Jews. The Balfour Declaration had been unjust and contrary to all international principles. The fact that it had been incorporated in a Mandate given by the League of Nations did not make it more just. Even supposing the Arab States entering the League of Nations had subscribed to the Mandate (and it was known from statements of the representatives of Iraq and Egypt that they had not) such acceptance would not have made the Balfour Declaration more moral or more just. The Arab States had constantly protested against the injustice of this Declaration. But even assuming that the Arab States were prepared to acquiesce in it, this would not prevent the Arabs of Palestine from rejecting it as unjust.

It was clear from the history of the past 25 years that the chief reason for disturbance in the Middle East had been Jewish immigration into Palestine. Every British Committee of Enquiry since 1922 had found that the trouble in Palestine was caused by Jewish immigration and that further immigration would be a source of bloodshed. In the face of these facts and realities he was surprised that the British Delegation proposed that further immigration should take place.

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H.E HAKKI BEY said that the British Delegation appeared to be disappointed at the attitude adopted by the Arabs to the new plan. The disappointment of the Arabs was even greater that after all they had said to make their point of view clear, their basic objections were not met. They had been told that the British plan had discarded partition. This was not true as the plan merely relegated partition to the background for the time being. Under the wide range of powers accorded to local administrations the Jews would be enabled to consolidate their arrangements for the establishment of a Jewish State. The transference of the functions of the Jewish Agency to the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would not put an end to the activities of the Agency, who would still constitute a state within a state. He had no doubt that the ultimate result of a system of area autonomy would be the establishment of a Jewish State. The object of Jewish immigration was clear and could be illustrated by the reports of the latest arrival of illegal immigrants at Haifa, who were discovered to be all young people likely to contribute towards the upbuilding of a Jewish majority. They had been specially selected as a powerful reinforcement for the Zionist invasion. When the Arabs asked His Majesty's Government to adhere to the immigration provisions of the White Paper they were told that circumstances had changed. He would like to submit that circumstances had in fact changed in favour of an acceptance of the Arab Plan. In 1939 the persecutors of the Jews in Europe were at the height of their power but even then the British Government had stated that they considered that their obligations to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine

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had been met. Now that the power of the Nazis in Europe had been broken why should the British Government insist upon further immigration? They should approach this problem in accordance with the spirit of today which had been embodied in the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 25th December, 1946, which had already been quoted, regarding the constitution of the International Refugee Organisation. Great Britain was trying to secure the favour of the United States by providing for the entry of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine in accordance with the demand of President Truman. If this spirit of bargaining was in fact the spirit of the great powers then their attitude to the United Nations appeared to be the same as that which brought the League of Nations to ruin.

SAMI EFFENDI TAHER said that the Foreign Secretary had asked why they did not attempt to find a solution to the problem in direct consultation with the Jews. He submitted that there was no dispute between Arabs and the Jews; the dispute was between the Arabs and Great Britain. Great Britain had brought the Zionists to Palestine; Great Britain should now stop them coming any more. In answer to a question by Mr Bevin, he said that he did not imply that the Jews of Palestine did not want further immigration.

MR DIMECHKIE said that peace and security in the Middle East, to which Mr Bevin attached such importance, could only be secured by following a just policy in Palestine. If a final settlement was desired the justice of the solution proposed by the Arabs must be clear.

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The Zionists supported their claims to Palestine by vociferous mingling of five main arguments. The first was the Jewish historical connection with the country. They had been there 2,000 years ago but this did not give them any right to return. After 2,000 years of occupation the Arabs had as much right to Palestine as the Americans had to the United States. The second was the suffering of their co-religionists in Europe. This was not the fault of the Arabs in Palestine but was a world problem which should be solved internationally. The third was their religious attachment to the country. This did not by itself entitle them to invade it. On this principle Christians and Moslems throughout the world could claim to go and stay in Palestine. The fourth was that they could by their industry ensure the economic progress of Palestine. Even if this were so it did not give them the right to invade the country. This was the argument which had been used by Mussolini in his attack on Abyssinia and had been used by Hitler in his attempt to absorb the Balkan States. The fifth was the Balfour Declaration. At the last session Mr Bevin had said that the Arabs had got all that they wanted with the help of Great Britain with the one exception of independence in Palestine. He was sure that Great Britain had helped the Arabs to gain their objectives not from a sense of the importance to Great Britain of securing Arab friendship but because these objectives were recognised as just. An unjust promise made in the past did not justify Zionist claims. Mr Bevin had suggested that the problem should be solved by compromise. For the last 25 years the Arab attitude to the question had been one of compromise. He understood a compromise to be a matter of give and take. The Jews had been continually taking and the Arabs had been continually giving. They had now given enough and could see no room for further compromise.

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H.E. DR. FAWZI MULKI said that the latest British proposals did not satisfy any of the three main requirements of the Arabs; these were immigration, independence and the prohibition of land sales.

Answering a question from Mr. Bevin as to whether it was impossible for the Jews and Arabs to meet and discuss the problem, H.E. DR. JAMALI referred to a recent experience in New York when he had had a continuous discussion lasting eight hours with moderate Jews, at the end of which the Jews still insisted on their right to a Jewish state in Palestine.

MR. CREACH JONES pointed out that the British proposals offered neither a Jewish state, nor partition.

H.E. DR. JAMALI contested that the proposals would nevertheless lead to that position.

MR BEVIN said that the Jews had turned down the British proposals for precisely the opposite reason. They feared that the scheme would leave them as a permanent minority in an Arab state. They also complained that, whereas under the Morrison plan provision had been made for the introduction of 100,000 immigrants in twelve months, the latest proposals only contemplated the introduction of 96,000 immigrants in two years. Mr Bevin said that the figure of 96,000 had been worked out on the basis of the economic capacity of the country taking into account that

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before the war the maximum number of Jewish immigrants who had entered Palestine in any one year was about 60,000. The Arab Delegates, when they considered the British proposals for immigration, should not lose sight of the fact that the Arab population of Palestine had considerably increased since the Balfour Declaration was made in 1917.

Some discussion ensued as to the extent of the increase of the Arab population since 1917, and it was stated from the Arab side that the increase of the Arab population in Palestine had been paralleled in other Arab countries where there were no substantial Jewish settlements. On the other hand the proportion of Jews to the total population of Palestine had risen from 7% in 1918 to 33% at the present day. The proportion of Arabs tended to decline correspondingly. One day the Jews would reach a proportion of 51% and they would then claim to have the Palestine problem solved on democratic lines.

The point was also made from the Arab side, that the Jews had never regarded the question of immigration from the point of view of the economic capacity of the country; for them it was a purely political issue.

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MR. BEVIN, dealing with this point, said that there was all the more reason why the number of immigrants into Palestine should, in case of dispute, be determined by an arbitration tribunal under the United Nations Organisation, as had been proposed under the latest British plan. Mr Bevin reiterated that the figure of 100,000 immigrants in the British plan had been assessed on considerations of economic absorptive capacity; it had not been put forward in order to placate the United States.

DR. OMAR KHALIL asked the British Delegation if they considered the Balfour Declaration was just from the Socialist point of view. The British had refused to make any compromise with the enemy during the recent war; how could they expect the Arabs to compromise between right and wrong?

MR. BEVIN doubted if Dr Khalil's analogy was a fair one. Whether the Balfour Declaration was right or wrong, it had been made and could not be ignored. Moreover, that Declaration had received a considerable measure of acquiescence from the Arabs at the time.

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accordance with democratic principles. The Arabs had never refused to allow the Jews in Palestine to take their fair share in the government of the country. Against the argument used by the United Kingdom Delegation that the Balfour Declaration had received a considerable measure of Arab acquiescence, Jamal Bey Husseini instanced the disturbances which took place when Lord Balfour visited Palestine. Since 1921 the Arabs had constantly protested both against the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration.

EMILE EFFENDI GHOURY said that the Mandate had been given to Britain by the League of Nations against the will of the Arabs and the Arabs could not be held responsible for the consequences. If Britain was unable to carry out her obligations she should leave Palestine to the Arab inhabitants. Every British Commission since 1918 had established the fact that the disturbances in Palestine were due to Jewish immigration. The Arabs could not permit their country to be invaded by more Jews. If Britain continued the policy of immigration there would be serious repercussions and the Arabs would have to revise their attitude to the Jews that were already there. It was simply adding fuel to the fire to allow further immigrants.

H.E. HAKKI BEY reminded the British Delegation that His Majesty's Government had said in the White Paper of 1939 that they had fulfilled their obligations to establish a Jewish national home.

MR CREECH JONES said that during the period of the League of Nations Britain had been required to report on her administration of Palestine to the Mandates Commission. The only occasion on which her administration had been criticised was when she had followed a policy favourable to the Arabs under the White Paper of 1939. During the war of 1914/1918 Great Britain had brought liberation to the Arab world. The Mandate had not been drawn up behind the backs of the Arabs; there had been consultations with the Arabs; the

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Amir Feisal had been consulted at the Peace Conference of 1919.

Several Arab Delegates disputed the statement that Amir Feisal had been consulted.

H.E. HAKKI BEY, dealing with the suggestion that Arabs and Jews should meet together to discuss the Palestine problem asked if it was intended that the Arabs should meet representatives of world Jewry. If that were to be so, then the Arabs ought to have with them representatives of all the Moslems and all the Christians in the world. The Jews were an international community and their representatives were not merely representatives of Palestine.

MR CREECH JONES suggested that Palestinian Arabs and Palestinian Jews should meet.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI referred to occasions in 1921 and 1939 when Arabs had met Jews with completely unfruitful results.

DR KHALIDI said that the problem of Palestine was not economic, but political. The absorptive capacity of the United Kingdom, or the United States was probably much greater than that of Palestine. Why should not the Jews go to one or other of these countries?

MR BEVIN said that the United Kingdom had already taken a large number of Jews.

DR KHALIDI said that while it was true that the League of Nations had given the Mandate to the United Kingdom, the Balfour Declaration had been made by the United Kingdom; that was why the Arabs thought that the United Kingdom was responsible for Zionism in Palestine.

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JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI said that, although the Mandate was not passed until 1922, it was applied in draft by the British as from 1921. The Arabs had had no say at all in the framing of the Mandate. The Arabs did not want to have a quarrel with Britain and if she could not discharge her duties effectively, she should withdraw from Palestine. The Arabs would like Britain to withdraw and hand back the country to the inhabitants. The Arabs knew how to deal with the problem of law and order.

CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUN said that the Arab plan was a just settlement of the problem of Palestine and it provided a basis for the future relations between Britain and Palestine. The Arab plan provided for the cessation of the Mandate, the stoppage of immigration, a transitional period of two years while the Constitution was being framed, the establishment after two years of an independent Palestine state and the making of a treaty of friendship between the United Kingdom and Palestine.

MR. CREECH JONES asked whether the Arabs contemplated that Britain would be responsible for law and order during the transitional period.

H.E. DR. JAMALI said that the local government would raise police forces, although they might well ask for British police to be retained.

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SIR NORMAN BROOK asked whether it was correct that the Arabs still wished the British Administration to continue for the transitional period provided for in the Arab plan, but that if Britain decided not to do so, the Arabs would make themselves responsible for the administration of the country.

H.E. CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUN assented to this proposition.

MR BEVIN said that the British Delegation would now report the results of their discussions to the Cabinet.

The meeting then adjourned.

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, S.W.1.

12TH FEBRUARY, 1947.

# OUTWARD TELEGRAM

E 1386 / 2 / P1

Keep with pp 83  
11/12

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 13th February, 1947. 22.30 hrs.

## IMMEDIATE

No. 308 Secret.

INDEXED

Palestine Conference.

Eleventh meeting with the Arab Delegations was held on 12th February. Mr. Bevin said that the Arab reply had been received and had been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government: unfortunately it seemed that agreement was as distant as ever. The Arabs had disclaimed any responsibility for the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate. He would remind them that some Arab States had joined the League of Nations and most were members of the United Nations. The Palestine Mandate was the work of the League of Nations and had now been handed over to the United Nations. He felt, therefore, that the Arab States could not disclaim all responsibility for the Mandate. His Majesty's Government had worked hard to find an alternative to the White Paper of 1939, if possible within the Mandate. If they could not find such an alternative they must press for a revision of the Mandate. This would mean reference to the United Nations and he would much prefer representatives of both sides of the problem to meet and settle the question out of court. In the United Nations, His Majesty's Government would be unable to mediate as they were doing now.

2. Representatives of Egypt and Iraq maintained that their States in joining the League had explicitly repudiated the Mandate. Dr. Jamali said that the solution could not come by compromise as there could be no compromise between right and wrong. The British plan was a surrender to Zionism as it coincided with long-term Zionist aims as expressed by Dr. Weizmann. He felt that an explosion was near and the Arab Governments would be unable to prevent it. The Arab peoples were more insistent than their Governments on stopping Zionist expansion in Palestine. Hakki Bey said he had no doubt that the/

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the ultimate outcome of a system of area autonomy would be the establishment of a Jewish State. The immigration provisions of the plan were a concession to the demand of President Truman. Other Delegates contested the justice of the Mandate and expressed the view that the present proposals were bound to lead to the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine.

3. The Foreign Secretary said that the Jews had turned down the proposals for precisely the opposite reason. They feared that the scheme would leave them as a permanent minority in an Arab State. They also complained that, whereas under the Morrison Plan provision had been made for the introduction of 100,000 immigrants in 12 months, the latest proposals only contemplated the introduction of 96,000 immigrants in two years. He said that the figure of 96,000 had been worked out on the basis of the absorptive capacity of the country, and was not due to President Truman's demand for 100,000. Some inconclusive discussion then took place on the probable counterbalancing effect of Arab natural increase on Jewish immigration. It was pointed out by the British Delegation that as there was bound to be great variance of opinion on economic capacity and demographic trends, it had been suggested in the proposals that disputes over immigration should be determined by an international arbitration tribunal.

4. I reminded the Delegates that Britain had assumed an international obligation in accepting the Mandate which represented the decision of all the nations at the Peace Conference of 1919, and if she found difficulty in administering it she must either go to the United Nations or seek to surmount the difficulties in co-operation with the communities primarily involved. I asked them if they wished Great Britain to wash her hands of the Palestine problem and take it to the United Nations or withdraw completely from Palestine. Several Delegates asserted that they were prepared to see Great Britain withdraw immediately and that the Arabs would assume responsibility for Government including law and order.

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5. Dr. Jamali expressed the hope that when Great Britain asked the United Nations to terminate the Mandate she would explain that it had failed because of the attempt to impose one people on another. If the case were so presented the Arabs might expect fair treatment.

6. The Foreign Secretary asked if he was correct in understanding the position to be that the Arab Delegates stood by the plan drawn up last September, and that they now wished Great Britain to surrender the Mandate. Jamel Hussein said the Arabs would be willing to take Palestine over as soon as Britain decided to leave. Dr. Jamali added that the Arab States would help in the policing of Palestine if they were requested to do so on the departure of the British. Arab Delegates agreed that they would wish British administration to continue for the transitional period provided for in the Arab Plan, but, if Britain decided not to do so, the Arabs would make themselves responsible for the administration of the country. The Foreign Secretary said that the British Delegation would report the results of their discussion to the Cabinet.

## Distributed to:-

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- P.S. to Prime Minister.

- Sir N. Brook.

- Mr. C.G. Eastwood.

- Mr. E.A. Armstrong.

- Air Commodore K.C. Buss.

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CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

P.C. (A)(P) 11th Meeting

COPY NO. 70

PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946-47

UNITED KINGDOM - ARAB DELEGATIONS

Notes of Eleventh Meeting held at 1 Carlton Gardens,  
London, S.W.1., on Wednesday, 12th February, 1947, at 11.0 a.m.

No amendments to the above minutes having been received,  
it is requested that the copies of the Draft Minutes in your  
possession should be regarded as FINAL copies.

ST. JAMES'S PALACE S.W.1.

17th February, 1947.

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PC(A)(P) Y

14 Feb 1947

17 Feb 1947

Palastine Conference

Note by Secretariat

attached statement by SAMI EFFENDI  
TAHER is circulated for the information  
of Delegations at the request of the  
Palestinian Arab Delegation.

Last Paper.

1386

(Minutes.)

H-3. 17/2

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

C. Dept. Comps.

Amman

Bagdad

Beirut

B.M. K.V.

Cairo

Damascus

Tripoli

W. Yon

FORD

Bangalore

Feb 19

(Action completed.)

PSM/14/2

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18/5/48

Next Paper.

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
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P.C.(A)(P) 7



COPY NO. 56

PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946-47

Note by the Secretariat

The attached statement by Sami Effendi Taher is circulated for the information of Delegations at the request of the Palestinian Arab Delegation.

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, S.W.1.,

14TH FEBRUARY, 1947.

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of the British population are of the same mind. They told me that the side of Zionism only was represented to them and that they had no idea regarding the Arab point of view. I say, as a Trade Unionist, therefore, that such a sweeping resolution should have no value, particularly as the time has now come when the facts are being exposed to the world and so much is happening before our eyes which cannot be denied. Surely now it must be perfectly clear that when the Party voted against the White Paper of 1939 it did so in complete ignorance of the true position!

Would it not, therefore, be a wise move to recognise the position and ignore the resolution to which I refer? I do believe that the Party is cherishing a progressive policy and is wise enough, not only to put aside a wrong policy, but to fight against it if circumstances make such a course necessary.

The second point is that the White Paper was not satisfactory internationally. H.M. Government should have adhered to the White Paper of 1939, and in no circumstances should it have been changed, such as it was in this case, until such a time as it was rejected internationally.

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Mr. Creech Jones said quite a lot about the prosperity in Palestine and how the Arabs' standard of life had been uplifted. I do not wish to indulge in argument regarding the economic side of the Palestine question, but I would like to state, as a competent man on these affairs, that the standard of life of the Arabs in Palestine amongst workers and peasants, is still lagging very much behind the subsistence level of the minimum living in Palestine. We Arabs have lost thousands of working days during the last 21 years, from our first existence, to uplift our standard of life, and about 40 thousand working days have been lost in one strike against the Government in the last year to raise our standard of living, and yet we are still behind the minimum of the subsistence level of living - 40% to be exact.

I would refer Mr. Creech Jones to the balance of Palestine imports and exports to find out for himself how many millions of pounds deficit there are in our exports and to tell us after that if this means what he calls "prosperity of Palestine". I said I did not wish to argue on the economic side, because the question of Palestine is far deeper than that - it is the Political question 100%, and a question of a depressed and exploited nation struggling for its liberty and independence for which it has sacrificed so much in blood and economy.

We Arab workers look at the Palestine question from its factual side, that it is one of the victims of the Imperialist



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At the outset of 1945 we warned the people of the peace-loving nations from the platform of the W.F.T.U. Conference to avoid the dangers which will come out of the reactionary movement of Zionism and we appealed to them to



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go thoroughly into the theories of Zionism, which are based on race and creed. Today I appeal to the Labour Government in Great Britain to liquidate Zionism in order to preserve a World Peace. The dangers of reactionary Zionism have appeared in Great Britain and the masses and individuals are complaining about the Jews and these complaints may result in anti-Semitic ideas.

It is my considered opinion that if the Palestine question is settled democratically and fairly on the lines indicated here, it will result in the liquidation of Zionism which has flourished since the Balfour Declaration.

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PALESTINE

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E 1435/2/31

U.K. Del

Palestine Conference

PC(A/P) 12th

mtg

14 Feb 1947  
17 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference.

Transmit notes of 12th Meeting  
with Arab Delegations 14 Feb 1947.

Last Paper.

1434

References.

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F.O.D. Feb 1947

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completed.)

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GEM 19/2

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Next Paper.

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(Minutes.)

H.B. 17/2

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FO 371 / 61748



PC(A)(P) 12th Meeting (Draft)

17 FEB

Copy No.

PALESTINE CONFERENCE, 1946-47

UNITED KINGDOM - ARAB DELEGATIONS

Notes of Twelfth Meeting held at 1 Carlton Gardens, London,  
S.W.1., on Friday, 14th February, 1947, at 3 p.m.

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The Rt. Hon. A. Creech Jones, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for the Colonies

Sir Norman Brook  
Secretary of the Cabinet

## FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Robert Howe  
Mr C.W. Baxter  
Mr J.P.E.C. Henniker-Major

COLONIAL OFFICE

Sir Douglas Harris  
Mr I.D. Robertson

ARAB DELEGATIONS

EGYPT

His Excellency Abdel Fattah Amr Pasha

His Excellency Abdel Rahman Hakki Bey

M. Abdel Moneim Mostafa

M. Mohamed Mostafa Yassin

(i)

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IRAQ

His Excellency Dr Fadhil Jamali

M. Arkhan Abadi

M. Bashaian

LEBANON

His Excellency Camille Bey Chamoun

M. Victor Khoury

PALESTINE ARABS

Jamal Bey Hussein

Dr Hussein Khalidi

Emile Effendi Ghoury

Sami Effendi Taher

Dr Omar al Khalil

Yusuf Effendi Sahyun

SAUDI-ARABIA

His Excellency Sheikh Hafiz Wahba

SYRIA

His Excellency Amir Adil Arslan

His Excellency Dr Najib Armenazi

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TRANSJORDAN

His Highness Abdul Majid Haidar  
Hani Bey Hashim  
His Excellency Dr Fawzi Bey Mulki

YEMEN

His Royal Highness Seif-al-Islam Abdullah  
El Sayid Hassin Ali Ibrahim  
Dr Adnan Tarcici

Mr. B. Dajani (Interpreter)

CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Mr E.A. Armstrong	Secretary
Mr C.A. Gault	Assistant Secretaries
Mr W.A.C. Mathieson	
Mr S. Naish	Social Secretary.

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MR. DEVIN said that His Majesty's Government had sought for a very long time to reach a solution of the Palestine problem. The proposals which they had recently put forward offered a reasonable solution and might well have formed a basis of discussion. They contemplated an independent Palestine which was neither Arab nor Jewish but represented the people of the country. This solution had, however, been rejected by both Arabs and Jews. His Majesty's Government were impressed by the unanimity with which both parties had rejected it. The situation in Palestine was a serious one and His Majesty's Government still had an interest in maintaining peace in the Middle East. His Majesty's Government had failed to get the parties to agree but it was still his hope and dream that the problem would eventually be settled to the satisfaction of Arabs and Jews and in a way which would contribute to the peace and security of the Middle East.

Great Britain took pride in her friendship with the Arab countries. She did not want to use force against them. Once the political difficulties which separated them were removed he believed that the way would be open for economic development of the Middle East which would eventually make that area into one of the most fruitful parts of the world. That was the objective of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government desired to co-operate with the Middle East countries in this development.

Mr. Bevin begged the Arab Delegates not to leave London with any prejudice in their minds, but with a statesmanlike determination not to lose any opportunity of reaching a solution if the situation changed in the meanwhile.

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Great Britain had held the Palestine Mandate for twenty-five years and His Majesty's Government believed that their achievements during that period had been for the benefit of the country.

Mr Bevin said that he did not despair, even yet, that a solution would be reached. The work of the peace-maker was hard and difficult but he contributed more to civilisation than the soldier. Mr Bevin asked that the Arab Governments should apply their minds to the question whether the problem could not be solved between now and the time when the matter was brought before the United Nations.

It was with profound regret that His Majesty's Government had to admit failure, for the first time in British history, to solve a problem of this kind. His Majesty's Government had decided to refer the matter to the United Nations. They would inform the United Nations of the history of the problem and put before them all the various solutions which had hitherto been recommended, including the reports of Royal Commissions, the plan put forward at the present Conference by the Arab Delegations and the British plan. His Majesty's Government would not make a recommendation in favour of any one solution. They would leave this to the decision of the United Nations and they would accept that decision.

Mr Bevin said that he would not disguise the fact that from the purely British point of view and also from the point of view of Arab security this decision of His Majesty's Government was a grave one. His Majesty's Government had hoped that it would have been possible to solve the Palestine problem and other matters affecting Great Britain and the Arab countries by direct negotiation among themselves, and thereafter to usher in an era of collaboration for the benefit of their several countries and of the world.

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H.E. AMR PASHA said that at the last meeting Mr Bevin made a remark to the effect that he was given to understand that one or two of the Arab States would not seriously oppose partition if it was put into execution. He (Amr Pasha) had been instructed to declare publicly and emphatically that Egypt would not be a party to any solution of the Palestinian problem based on a plan in which the idea of partition was given effect, directly or indirectly, or in any of its forms.

H.E. DR JAMALI said that the Government of Iraq would also oppose a solution by partition and the continuance of immigration. On these points there was complete unanimity between the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people.

H.E. CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUM declared that the position of the Lebanese Government was similar.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI said that the attitude of the Palestinian Arabs was identical with that taken by previous speakers. Many British Commissions had recommended adversely to partition during recent years. Palestine was a small country and could not be divided. The Palestinian Arabs could not accept any invasion whether by Jews or by anyone else. Palestine was already overcrowded.

H.E. SHEIKH HAFIZ TAHBA said that His Majesty King Ibn Saud was opposed to the partition of Palestine in any form and to the continuance of immigration. He and his people believed that there would never be peace in Palestine so long as immigration continued.

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Arabs of Palestine the Anglo-Arabian Alliance and asking that they should join the Sherifian Army to liberate their country and realise the independence of the Arab nation. Several thousands of them actually did volunteer.

Shortly after the end of the first world war the British Government made an official declaration which was distributed all over Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon, stating that their only aim was to enable the people to get the form of government they wished.

On his last visit to London in 1933, the late King Feisal of Iraq proposed to the British Government, led by Mr Macdonald, the following scheme -

- (i) stoppage of immigration;
- (ii) a real legislative assembly for Palestine and after ten years the abolition of the Mandate.

The British Government accepted this scheme in principle and Lord Swinton, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, received a mission which was to discuss details with the late King after his return from Berne. But His Majesty had died before discussions could begin.

The British Government was now taking account only of the Zionist point of view and neglecting that of the Arabs and of the non-Zionist Jews. The only British Minister who was against the Balfour Declaration was Mr Montague, then Secretary of State for India.

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Independence was the natural right of all nations whether promised by Great Britain or not. Great Britain could not possibly fight at one and the same time for the freedom of certain peoples and the subjugation of others. Justice and democracy were indivisible.

The Arab Delegates had been conferring with the representatives of a democratic country and a great nation and they were sure that Great Britain did not wish either to tyrannize the Arabs of Palestine or to injure Arab feeling as a whole.

For these reasons he could not help asking if this pro-Zionist policy was in accordance with the public opinion of the United Kingdom.

H.R.H. SEIF-AL-ISLAM ABDULLAH, who spoke in Arabic, said that the members of the Arab Delegations had fully explained the present position in regard to Palestine and he fully endorsed their views. He regretted that no final agreement as to a satisfactory solution of the problem had been found. Yet he believed that the Arab Delegates had succeeded in making their opinion very clear in an atmosphere of complete frankness. There was no doubt that the Arab Delegates had shown a great deal of wisdom in formulating their proposals which were based on grounds of justice, wisdom and generosity. The fact that the proposals had the unanimous approval of the Arab Delegates went to prove that much thought had been given to the problem in the light of previous events. After careful study of all alternative solutions the Arabs felt that their plan was the only practical solution.

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immigration. It was only just and honest that the status quo should be maintained on the basis of the White Paper, and there should be no further immigration pending the submission of the Palestine problem to the United Nations Organisation. The point was a legal one which should be looked at from the legal point of view.

MR BEVIN said that His Majesty's Government felt that the continuance of a small immigration quota until the United Nations reached a decision would not upset the situation in Palestine very much, but what had been said in this connection would certainly be considered.

H.E DR JAMALI said that the Arabs had not lost all hope. They felt that their scheme was the fairest solution and the British Government should study it again carefully. The scheme deserved to be explained to the world. The fact that it allowed 600,000 aliens to live in the country showed great generosity. As regards the traditional Arab friendship with Britain the Arabs all wished to preserve it for they valued it highly. The main obstacle was Zionism, which they felt threatened the stability and security of the Middle East. They would go to the United Nations as friends of Britain but they would expect the British to present the Palestine case fairly and acknowledge frankly that the Mandate had been a mistake and was contrary to the principles of justice and democracy in that it imposed one people on another. The Arabs could not accept the status of a minority community and this fact would have to be taken into account in any settlement. As regards the interim policy to be followed until the United Nations made their decision, the Arabs desired the maintenance of peace and security in Palestine, and

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 Reference: - **FO 371 / 61748**  
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the cessation of immigration and terrorism.

MR BEVIN gave an assurance that all the facts of the case and all the relevant documents would be submitted to the United Nations. His Majesty's Government would make no recommendations but they would take care that the case was impartially presented.

H.E. DR JAMALI enquired what would be the position over immigration during the interim period. When the Conference was adjourned in September, it had been agreed that limited immigration should continue as immigrants already held in camps would fill the quotas of 1,500 a month up to March 1947. The application of this agreement had been complicated by continued illegal immigration. He therefore made a further appeal for the cessation of immigration during the interim period.

SIR NORMAN BROOK said that the agreement reached had been that during the period of adjournment the rate of immigration would not be raised above 1,500 a month. At the time of the adjournment there were already in camps awaiting admission under the quota system enough illegal immigrants to fill the quotas up to March 1947. The agreement had been kept and the question of departure from it did not therefore arise.

H.E. CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUN said that in the period from the establishment of the Anglo-American Committee up to the present, immigration had gone on at the rate of 1,500 per month. He hoped that during the next interim period there would be no immigration. If the

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United Nations decided otherwise, the position would be different.

SIR NORMAN BROOK said that this point would be considered.

MR BEVIN said that Britain had done her best in difficult circumstances and the decision to hand the Mandate back to the United Nations was a hard one. Britain, however, wanted her relations with Palestine to be on the basis of a treaty, not a Mandate, in order to obtain finality. To that end the British plan had been put forward.

MR CREENCH JONES said that he much regretted that no solution had been found at the Conference. It would now fall to the British Government to try to maintain the situation in Palestine until the United Nations made their decision. He knew it would be a very difficult period because of the clash of interests between the two communities in Palestine who both felt that they had right and justice on their side. Britain had always sought to retain the goodwill of both parties. She wanted only to secure the happiness and prosperity of Palestine.

Arabs and Jews might perhaps think that the British administration had its short-comings but co-operation had in practice proved very difficult to obtain. The British Government bore no ill will towards Arabs or Jews and he hoped that the Arabs would bear none towards Britain as a result of this Conference.

The proceedings of the Conference were then brought to a conclusion.

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, S.W.1.

14TH FEBRUARY, 1947.

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2

Reference:-

**EO** 371 / 61748

53

E

E 1436

1947

PALESTINE

17 FEB

109

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E1436/2/31.

Embassy

Bagdad.

36

236/6/47

3 Feb 1947

17 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference  
 Encloses copy of note Verbale N° 57  
 of Feb 3 to Ministry of Foreign  
 Affairs, containing invitation to  
 Arab Higher Committee of Palestine  
 to resume London Conference. ref note  
 from Cairo 362/10/47 (E873/2/31).

Last Paper.

1475

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action  
completed.)

E.M. 1/8/2

(Index.)

189  
76/48

Next Paper.

E1487

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:-

FO

371

61748



No. P.L. 36  
236/6/47

E 110

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad  
presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary  
of State or Foreign Affairs  
and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British Embassy, .....

....Bagdad.....

E 1436  
17 FEB

3rd February, 1947

Reference to previous correspondence :

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Copy of Note Verbale No 57 of 3rd February 1947 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Invitation to Arab Higher Committee of Palestine to resume London Conference.



1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-  
**FO 371 / 61748**

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No. 37

NOTE VERBALE

His Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honour to inform them that the following Note No 362/10/47, was addressed by His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo to the Secretary General of the League of Arab States on January 21st last.

E873/2/51

2. "His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary General of the League of Arab States and with reference to the latter's memo No 3373/60/1/11 of December 15th last, has the honour, on instructions from His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to point out that His Majesty's Government have invited the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine to send a Delegation to resume the London Conference on Palestine. His Majesty's Ambassador is directed to express the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the Committee's acceptance of this invitation.

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador avails himself of this opportunity to render to the Secretary General of the League of Arab States the assurance of his very high consideration."

His Majesty's Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to render the expression of its highest consideration.

British Embassy,

Bagdad.

3rd February, 1947

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Reference:-

FO

371

61748



54

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E 1487

112

1947

PALESTINE

18 FEB

Registry  
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 1487/2/31

Sir A Kirkbride

Amman

H 9.

18 Feb 1947

18 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference.

Re: Amman H 4 (E 1330/2/31). Informs  
which gal Royal Very paramount chief of  
Gua Sahbi tribe also received telegram  
from the Sultan asking for intervention.  
He replied in non-committal terms. It  
may well be that similar messages have  
been addressed to other tribal chiefs in  
Transjordan.

Last Paper.

1436

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action  
completed.)J E M  
20/

(Index.)

H 4  
5/6/48

Next Paper.

E 1493

30471 F.O.P.

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4
5
6

Reference:-

FO

371

61748

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION  
FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 1487

18 FEB

Sir A. Kirkbride  
No. 49.

D. 12.40 p.m. February 18th, 1947.

February 18th, 1947.

R. 12.30 p.m. February 18th, 1947.

Repeated to Bagdad ... No. 7)  
Beirut ... No. 7)  
Cairo ... No. 10) (F.O. please pass)  
Damascus ... No. 7)  
Jedda ... No. 9)  
B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 9)  
Jerusalem SAVING

JJJ

IMMEDIATE

Reference my telegram No. 44 of February 11th.

Palestine Conference.

Mithgal Royal Venz paramount chief of Gua [sic]  
Sakhr tribe also received a telegram from the Mufti  
asking for intervention. He replied in non-committal  
terms. It may well be that similar messages have  
been addressed to other tribal chiefs in Transjordan.

[Repeated to Bagdad, Beirut, Ambassador Cairo,  
Damascus, Jedda and B.M.E.O. Cairo as Foreign Office  
telegrams Nos. 151, 108, 381, 79, 83 and 178  
respectively.]



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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61748

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E

E 1493

114

PALESTINE

19 FEB

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E1493/2/31.

U. H. Del

Palestine Conference

PC(A)(47) 4

17 Feb 1947

19 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference.

Note by Secretary. Informing that  
conference has now concluded, and  
the secretariat has been disbanded.  
Give information re further enquiries.

Last Paper.

1487

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

C. Dept. Comm.

Amman

Beirut

Baghdad

Bagdad

Bair

Damascus

Iddle

W. Horn

70 RD

(Action  
completed.)

FSM 20/2

(Index)

2/16/48

Next Paper.

1494

(Minutes.)

1153. 19/2

1
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6

Reference:-

FO

371


61748

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CONFIDENTIAL

F.C.(A)(47)4



115  
COPY NO. 13

PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946-47

Note by the Secretary

The Conference has now concluded and the Secretariat has been disbanded. Further enquiries should be directed to the individual members of the Secretariat at their respective Departments as follows:-

Mr E.A. Armstrong

Cabinet Office  
Telephone No.  
Whitehall 5422 Ext. 60

Mr C.A. Gault

Foreign Office  
Telephone No.  
Whitehall 8440 Ext. 10

Mr W.A.C. Mathieson

Colonial Office  
Telephone No.  
Whitehall 9191 Ext. 518

The Press Officer, Mr A.J. Heller, can be contacted at the Colonial Office. Enquiries regarding travel facilities should be directed to Communications Department, Foreign Office (Ext. 316) or, in the case of the Palestinian Arab Delegates, to Mr Mathieson.

(Signed) E.A. ARMSTRONG

Secretary of the Conference

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, S.W.1.

17TH FEBRUARY, 1947.

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Reference:-					
FO 371 / 61718					

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1947

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E 1494

NB

PALESTINE

19 FEB

Registry  
Number

FROM

U.K. Rel  
No. Palestine Conference

Dated

Received  
in RegistryE1494/2/31.  
P.C.(A)(P) 12 mtg  
17 Feb 1947  
19 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference

Notes on 12th meeting. Corrigenda,  
Page nine second para  
Delete and substitute.

Last Paper.

1493

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Depth Bombs.

Amman

Beirut

Bagdad

Brick V

Cairo

Feddah

Damascus

W'ron

FORU Feb

(Action  
completed.)

GCH 20/2

(Index.)

5/6/48

Next Paper.

1500

(Minutes.)

H-13. 19/12

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1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO 371 / 61748

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CONFIDENTIAL

P.C.(A)(P) 12th Meeting

E 1494

19 FEB

Copy No. 70

PALESTINE CONFERENCE, 1946-47

UNITED KINGDOM - ARAB DELEGATIONS

Notes of Twelfth Meeting held at 1, Carlton Gardens, London,  
S.W.1., on Friday, 14th February, 1947, at 3 p.m.

CORRIGENDA

Page 9, second paragraph

Delete existing paragraph and substitute:-

"H.E. DR. JAMALI enquired what would be the position over immigration during the interim period. Before the Conference was adjourned in September the Arab Delegations were told that the limited immigration quotas of 1,500 monthly would be absorbed by immigrants already held in camps up to March, 1947. The situation had been complicated by the continued admission of illegal immigrants. He therefore made a further appeal for the cessation of immigration during the interim period."

No other amendments to the above minutes having been received, it is requested that the copies of the Draft Minutes in your possession should be regarded as FINAL copies.

St. James's Palace, S.W.1.

17TH FEBRUARY, 1947.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61748

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1947

E

E 1500

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PALESTINE

19 FEB

Registry  
Number

E1500/2/31

FROM

Embassy

No.

Cairo

Dated

132.

Received  
in Registry

362/42/47

13 Feb 1947

18 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference

Refer 70. tel 297 (E1231/2/31) Encloses  
note to Mahmud Fahmy & L. Makrahi  
Pasha, Enclosing Summary of proposals  
for further negotiations regarding  
Palestine.

Last Paper.

1494

(Minutes.)

HB 207/2

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action  
completed.)

JEM 2/2

(Index.)

R 5/10/48

Next Paper.

E1534

32003 F.O.P.

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Reference:-

FO

371

61748

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/AJS

N 132

(362/42/47)

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to  
His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
and has the honour to transmit herewith copies of the under-  
mentioned paper.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
CAIRO.

13th February 1947

Reference to previous communication:

Foreign Office telegram No. 297 of 7.2.1947

Description of Enclosure.

Name, Date, etc.

Subject.

TO: His Excellency Mahmoud Fahmy  
El-Nokrashi Pasha, Presi-  
dent of the Ministers,  
CAIRO

Summary of proposals  
for further negotiations  
regarding Palestine.

No: 362/42/47.

DATED: 13.2.1947.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61748

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